Abstract-In wireless sensor networks, since a CH gathers data from members and delivers the gathered data to the sink, preventing a compromised node from being a CH is very important. Even though unveiling the CH election process enhances the security of network, it cannot prevent compromised nodes from declaring themselves as CHs without qualification. In this paper, we propose a scheme which identifies the compromised nodes by evaluating the trust level of members and excludes untrustworthy nodes every CH election round. Our analyses show that our scheme outperforms the scheme which only unveils the CH election process without filtering.
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In this paper, we try to resolve the problem as follows. First, our scheme evaluates the trust value of members by tallying their CH fulfillment frequency. Since the compromised nodes undoubtedly try to become a CH, their CH fulfillment frequency and trust value are going to become smaller with the lapse of time. For every CH election round, our scheme expels some untrustworthy members from CH candidates to mitigate the threat of compromised nodes.
We organize our paper as follows. Section II briefly describes previous work dealing with secure CH election. In Section III, the network and threat model is presented and the detailed explanation of our scheme is provided in Section IV. We provide the analyses of our scheme and Holczer's scheme in Section V and finally we draw conclusion in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
Sirivianos et al. proposed a scheme where each member generates a random number and delivers the random number to other members in order to share a common sum [2] . Each member divides the common sum by the number of members and settles the remainder as the index of the CH node. According to the generation and distribution method of the common sum, the scheme is divided into Merkle's puzzle based scheme, commitment based scheme, and seed based scheme.
In Merkle's puzzle based scheme, the current CH first establishes pairwise keys with its members using the Merkle's puzzle. Then, the first member creates a random number and encrypts it using the pairwise key before delivering it to another member. Upon receiving the encrypted random number, the receiver adds its own value to the received value and passes the sum to another member. This procedure repeats until all members add their own value to the received value. The last member broadcasts the total sum and the current CH distributes members' pairwise keys to all members. Then, all members convert the total sum into a plain sum using the pairwise keys and the double additively homomorphic encryption. Note that the plain sum is employed as a common sum.
In the commitment based scheme, each member pair shares a unique pairwise key. For every CH election round, each member transmits its commitment to other members in the P2P manner. Here, the commitment is a random number which is encrypted using a shared pariwse key. Then, each member sends the proof for its commitment ownership (that is, original random number) to other members. Members verify the random numbers using the shared pariwse keys and sum them to make a common sum.
In the seed based scheme, each member generates an initial random number and broadcasts it. For every CH election Securing Cluster Head Elections in Wireless Sensor Networks Gicheol Wang and Gihwan Cho round, each member broadcasts an availability message which expresses the willingness of its join in the current CH election. Members receiving the message maintain the list of the availability message senders and generate a new random number of the senders with their initial random number and the number of election rounds. Then, members obtain the sum of the new random numbers and it is employed as a common sum. Merkle's puzzle based scheme causes a lot of overhead due to the pairwise key establishments, generation of the common random value, and the distribution of pairwise keys. The commitment based scheme and the seed based scheme are vulnerable to the intentional transmission avoidance and selective transmission of random number or availability message. Intentional transmission avoidance of random number or availability message changes the CH election result. Besides, selective transmission of random number or availability message makes multiple common sums in a cluster and splits a cluster into multiple ones.
Dong et al. proposed a CH election scheme which strongly prevents external attackers from joining in CH elections. The scheme's ability highly relies on their ID assignment scheme which tightly couples a node's ID, its commitments, and its polynomial shares [3] . In this scheme, members which do not distribute a participation message for CH election or explicitly distribute a non-participation message are removed from the CH candidates. The real CH is selected in a round robin manner from the rest of the candidates. In this scheme, a compromised node can readily change a CH election result by avoiding the transmission of its participation message. The compromised node can also produce multiple election results by transmitting its participation message to only a part of CH candidates. Even if this scheme has a recovery algorithm combining more than one result into single result, it premises the spontaneous cooperation of the CH candidates. However, compromised nodes will not cooperate with it.
Buttyan et al. proposed a scheme which veils the election process from external nodes using the message encryption and decryption [4] . However, a compromised node can easily know the election result. Moreover, the compromised node can declare itself as a CH regardless of its suitability.
Holczer et al. proposed a completely hidden election scheme in [5] . This scheme consists of two steps. At the first step, each member elects itself as a CH according to the probability that a member becomes a CH. At the second step, each member checks if there is a member which elected itself as a CH. The check reveals only the existence or inexistence of CH node and none of the members knows which node is the CH in the cluster due to the difficulty of discrete logarithm. Even though the authors in [6] claim that the Holczer's scheme is one of the best CH election schemes in terms of security, it also has the same vulnerability as [5] . That is, a compromised node can declare itself as a CH without any constraint.
III. NETWORK AND THREAT MODEL

A. Network Model
We assume that nodes securely form clusters to perform the energy-efficient TDMA communication after they are deployed in the mission field. After nodes formed the clusters, their network operation is split into multiple rounds and each round is again split into three steps. Those steps are candidate reselection, secure CH election, and data aggregation and forward as depicted in Fig. 1 . In this paper, we only focus on those steps after the secure cluster formation. Please refer to [1] , [7] , [8] concerning the secure cluster formation. In the candidate reselection step, nodes pick up behaving nodes among all members in their cluster. In the secure CH election phase, nodes elect a node as the CH among the CH candidates. In the data aggregation and forward phase, nodes deliver their reading to the CH and the CH combines the readings and sends the combined data to the sink.
B. Threat Model
We assume that a compromised node arbitrarily declares itself as a CH during the CH election process. The effect of this malicious behavior is definite. The compromised node can play as a CH until it is recognized as an unqualified CH by other normal nodes and expelled from the network. Since the compromised node can get a great benefit from playing as a CH, it must try to sustain the CH role as long as possible. To our best knowledge, there is no way to prevent the malicious action. The only way to prevent the misbehavior is to exclude the compromised node prior to the CH election. 
IV. SECURING CLUSTER HEAD ELECTIONS USING RESELECTION OF CANDIDATES
We assume that external attackers are excluded from the network during the initial cluster formation process. Some cluster formation protocols [1] , [7] , [8] can be employed for that purpose. We also assume that all pairs of members in a cluster have established a pairwise key with each other. Therefore, the attackers in the remaining of this paper mean the compromised nodes. They are going to intentionally declare themselves as a CH in every CH election opportunity. In a round, our scheme consists of two steps. The first step picks out some candidates among all members in the cluster. To pick out some behaving nodes among all members, each member computes the trust value of other members in the cluster. The trust value is calculated by considering the previous trust value and the CH role fulfillment frequency. Note that the initial trust values of all members are one. Then each member averages the current trust values of members and excludes the nodes whose trust value is lower than the average from the candidates. We detail the first step in Section IV Part A. In the second step, the remaining time of the current round is divided into multiple frames and each frame is divided into CH election and fulfillment periods and the transmission period from CH to the sink. The number of CH election and fulfillment periods is equal to the number of members in the cluster. Besides, time length of the CH fulfillment period is exactly equal to the assigned time slot of each member and each member comes to know the assigned time slot when they have to wake up for the transmission during the initial cluster formation process. Fig. 2 shows the timeline of our scheme's network operation. Note that all members wake up every CH election period and determine whether it is going to play as a CH during the following CH fulfillment period and the determination relies on the CH winning probability which is explained in the following subsection. If a node decides to play as a CH during the following CH fulfillment period, it announces the result through a broadcast message to prevent the CH declaration of other members. Then, it plays the CH role during the CH fulfillment period. Besides, a node that is scheduled to transmit in the assigned time slot (that is, a CH fulfillment period) transmits its data to the declared CH. At the end of a frame, all CH role nodes in the current frame transmit the received data to the last CH role node in the frame and the last CH role node aggregates them and sends it to the sink. To provide the confidentiality of the transmissions between a member and the CH and the transmissions between CHs in a cluster, the pre-established pairwise keys can be used. We detail the third step in Section IV Part B. 
A. Reselection of CH Candidates
At the beginning of each round, each node evaluates the trust level of other members in the cluster. To quantify the trust level of a node, we introduce the variable 
Last, each node averages the values of i k T and compares the average trust value with the trust value of other members. The members whose trust value is lower than the average trust value are excluded from the CH candidates. If a node is excluded from the CH candidates, other members in the cluster set the node's current trust value to the node's previous trust value.
B. CH Elections and Data Aggregation 1) CH elections
After filtering out some suspected nodes from CH candidates, each node first goes to sleep and periodically awakes to elect itself as a CH according to its CH winning probability ( i CH P ) and fulfills the CH role during the following CH fulfillment period in case of the winning. The combination of CH election and CH fulfillment process repeats as the number of members in the cluster. The advantage of this approach is rotating the CH role node among the candidates so that a compromised CH can get a little amount of data from members during a short time. So, the CH winning probability ( i CH P ) is inversely proportional to real CH role frequency ( i CH F ) to equalize the opportunity of being a CH as shown in (2) . Namely, whenever a member elects itself as a CH, its CH winning probability decreases as
. If no CH is elected in a CH election period, each member recalculates the current trust value of all members and the most trustable node becomes the CH. If multiple nodes have the same trust value, ID is a tie breaker. That is, a lower ID is preferred as the CH.
2) Data Aggregation
In a CH fulfillment period, an elected CH and a node which
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is scheduled to transmit its reading remain in active state and other members go to sleep state again. Then, the node which is scheduled to transmit sends its reading to the elected CH. At the end of a frame, each CH role node sends the collected data to the last CH role node in the frame. The reason why the last CH role node gathers data from other CH role nodes is to avoid the pre-compromise of the data gatherer. That is, an attacker cannot predict which member is going to be the last CH role and therefore cannot aim at such a node as a compromise target. The last CH role node in the frame aggregates the received data and sends the aggregated data to the sink.
V. ANALYSES
We compare the proposed scheme with Holczer's scheme described in Section II. Under the circumstance where some compromised nodes exist, we seek the time during which compromised nodes play as a CH and the number of messages that the compromised CHs acquire from their members. Table  I shows the variables used in our analyses. In the Holczer's scheme, the probability that a compromised node is elected as a CH ( ic CH P ) is shown in (5) .Then, the expected number of compromised nodes in the network ( c CH E ) is computed as shown in (6) . Now, if any two compromised nodes are generated in a round, the time during which the i-th compromised node acts as a CH ( one i T ) can be computed using (7) . Contrarily, if any two compromised nodes are generated over multiple rounds, the time during which the i-th compromised node acts as a CH ( multi i T ) can be computed using (8) . Therefore, the time during which all compromised nodes act as a CH ( compromise all T ) is computed by (9). In our scheme, the probability that a compromised node is elected as a CH is shown in (10). Next, the expected number of compromised nodes in the network is calculated by (11). If any two compromised nodes are generated in a round, the time during which the i-th compromised node acts as a CH can be obtained by (12). On the other hand, if any two compromised nodes are generated over multiple rounds, the time during which the i-th compromised node acts as a CH can be obtained by (13). Consequently, the time during which all compromised nodes act as a CH is obtained by (14). Now, we estimate the number of messages that compromised CHs acquire from their members. First, we assume that each member senses d messages and delivers them to the CH in a round. If there is no message loss, the total number of collected messages in a cluster is Using the above equations, we evaluate the security of our scheme and Hloczer's scheme. We assume that the network operation time is 1800 seconds and compromise period is computed by dividing the network operation time by the number of compromised nodes. For example, if 10 nodes are compromised during the network operation time (i.e. 1800 seconds), a new compromised node is generated every 180 seconds. First, we show how the increase of compromised nodes affects their CH role duration time in Fig. 3 . As shown in Fig. 3 , our scheme dramatically reduces the CH role duration time of compromised nodes. This is because our scheme manages all members' trust value and excludes some untrustworthy nodes from CH candidates periodically. Contrarily, Holczer's scheme never evaluates the trust level of CH candidates and never reselects the trustworthy nodes. Therefore, if a node is compromised, it can keep declaring itself as a CH regardless of its qualification since then. That is why the performance difference between two schemes becomes larger as the number of compromised nodes increases. Now, we show how the increase of compromised nodes affects the number of messages that compromised CHs collect. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that each member gets a sensor reading every second. So, each member sends 30 messages to its CH during a round. As shown in Fig. 4 , our scheme significantly decreases the number of messages that compromised CHs gather from their members. This is greatly credited to a combination of our scheme's trust evaluation and exclusion of untrustworthy nodes. That is, because our scheme periodically evaluates the trust value of members and prevents some untrustworthy nodes from remaining as CH candidates, compromised nodes are likely to lose their chances to declare themselves as a CH. On the contrary, Holczer's scheme has no mechanism to evaluate the trust level of members in a cluster and reselects the CH candidates. So, if a node is compromised, it can keep declaring itself as a CH every CH election round. It makes the volume of messages that compromised CHs gather from their members greatly swollen as the number of compromised nodes increases as shown in Fig. 4 . 
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a secure election scheme that minimizes the effect of generation of compromised CHs. Our scheme periodically evaluates the trust level of members in a cluster considering their CH role fulfillment frequency. Then, our scheme picks out some untrustworthy nodes and expels them from the CH candidates. Our analysis shows that our scheme outperforms Holczer's scheme in terms of CH role duration time of compromised nodes. Besides, another analysis shows that our scheme allows compromised CHs to collect much smaller messages from members than Holczer's scheme.
